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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff will address the arguments contained in 
Appellees1 Brief (hereinafter "Def.Brief") under the same headings 
as contained in that brief. Those same references and 
abbreviations used in Plaintiff's Brief will be used in this reply 
brief, including the following: 
Declaration: Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, 
Restrictions and By-laws for Country Oaks Condominium; 
Act: Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1 
through 36; 
Fourth Supplemental Declaration: Fourth Supplemental and 
Amended Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and By-Laws for 
Country Oaks Condominium. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
Defendants argue that only one issue is presented for 
review and maintain the other issues raised by plaintiff were not 
decided by the trial court. Def. Brief, p.l. An examination of 
the issues presented for review by plaintiff indicates the trial 
court did decide these "other" issues. 
The first issue, stated on page 1 of Appellants' Brief, 
is: "Is the recorded Declaration creating Country Oaks Condominium 
binding on all unit owners?" This issue was decided by the trial 
court when the judge failed to apply the provisions of f 24.E of 
the Declaration to the defendants. The effect of the trial court's 
decision was to invalidate the Declaration and waive its provisions 
as to defendants. 
The second issue is: "Is there any form of private real 
property ownership available within Country Oaks Condominium other 
1 
than in the form of a 'unit'?" This issue was raised by plaintiff 
at trial, R. 67, and was resolved by the trial court by its ruling 
that defendants did not own units but owned a "right to build" 
condominium units. R. 262. The weakness in this ruling is that a 
right to build a condominium is a contract or personal property 
right, not an ownership interest in real property. If defendants 
or their predecessors do possess a private real property ownership 
interest in Country Oaks Condominiums in a form other than in a 
unit, that interest needs to be clearly defined so the parties know 
how and when liens attach to it and what interest and obligations 
are transferred with it. Such a ruling creates numerous problems 
in using the Act to determine rights and obligations in other 
situations. 
The parties agree that the third issue is properly before 
the court: "Do Defendants/Appellees own units at Country Oaks 
Condominium?" 
The fourth issue is: "If Defendants do not own units, 
what real property interest do they hold title to at Country Oaks 
Condominium?" This issue is a continuation of the second issue. 
It is also an issue that must be addressed if the Court rules 
defendants do not own units since defendants (or their 
predecessors) must own some form of real property interest in order 
to possess what they claim is a right to build a unit on real 
property at Country Oaks. 
The last issue, cited in 5 2(e) on page 2 of appellant's 
brief, addresses the conflict between the defendants who admitted 
2 
they owned units in their answer to the complaint and the trial 
court's ruling that these defendants did not own units.1 The 
trial court ruled on this issue when it ruled none of the 
defendants owned units in spite of their admission to the contrary. 
Defendants contend in their brief, page 1, that this 
appeal does not apply to the remaining defendants who have chosen 
not to respond to this appeal. There is no basis for such a 
statement. Plaintiff addresses this issue at length under the 
heading, "Which Parties Are Before This Court?" infra. Suffice it 
to say here that the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment as to all defendants; there were no facts at issue 
after the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, and plaintiff appealed that ruling to this Court. This 
appeal applies to all defendants. 
III. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On page 11 of their brief, defendants represent plaintiff 
consented to the entry of defendants' motion for summary judgement. 
This is not an accurate representation of the stipulation entered 
by the parties. In the stipulation plaintiff specifically stated 
it objected to the granting of summary judgement but consented to 
the court entering a decision on defendants' motion based on the 
1
 This issue is stated as follows: "Three of the Defendants 
did not contest the proceedings in the trial court except by 
answering the complaint. In their answer these Defendants admitted 
they owned the units in question. These three parties raised no 
factual challenges to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Did 
the trial court error in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiff when these three Defendants never challenged the claim 
they owned units or presented any facts to the contrary?" 
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prior memorandum filed. R. 388. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Paragraphs 6 and 9 of defendants1 statement of facts do 
not contain facts but are legal conclusions and arguments. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On page 15 of their brief, defendants state that between 
1978 and 1989 "no one has ever thought to treat a right to develop 
units as meaning that one is in fact a unit owner." Two points are 
relevant in response to this statement. First, defendants1 
predecessor, the declarant, was in control of the condominium 
during its initial years of development. The declarant did not 
bill itself for common expenses. This practice started a 
tradition of nonpayment by the declarant. Second, the declarant 
and its successors cannot wait indefinitely before they should pay 
for common expenses incurred in connection with their units. As 
shown by the affidavit of plaintiff, R.88, over $29,000.00 in 
common expenses which had nothing to due with repair to buildings 
were incurred during the 1989-90 fiscal year. These common 
expenses were incurred to resurface streets, clean up vacant 
property and conduct weed control directly affecting or contiguous 
to defendants1 units.2 
2
 Defendants state on page 12 of their brief that roads do 
not lead in front of all of defendants1 units. Of the 21 units at 
issue herein, paved roads, paid for and maintained solely by the 
plaintiff are in front of 17 units. The remaining 4 units are at 
the end of a dead-end road and have not been paved due to the lack 
of development by defendants. 
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Defendants further maintain (Def. Brief p.15) that 
plaintiff wants defendants to pay for common expenses incurred in 
connection with buildings already located at Country Oaks 
Condominium. As pointed out above, there are substantial costs 
associated with unimproved units because of the necessity of 
maintaining the streets and grounds that abut those units. It 
appears what defendants really want is for plaintiff to continue 
paying for common expenses incurred by plaintiff in connection with 
defendants' unimproved units. Defendants' obligation is the same 
as every other owner at Country Oaks, which obligation is to pay 
the proportionate share of common expenses as defined in the 
Declaration. Declaration, § 11. R. 287. Addendum, Exhibit "A". 
The issue as to which common expenses are incurred in 
relation to improved units as opposed to unimproved units was 
brought to a head in the trial court when defendants filed a motion 
in limine. R. 342. Defendants sought to "prohibit" any testimony 
from plaintiff regarding common expenses incurred by plaintiff in 
connection with such things as hourly wages, equipment, vacant lots 
and various administrative expenses. Defendants asserted that 
those common expenses "which should, as to all or part, be shared 
in proportionate amount by defendants, are the items which have to 
do with the grounds and streets." R. 344. As Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine points 
out, R. 354, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between 
common expenses incurred in connection with an improved unit as 
opposed to an unimproved unit. For example, defendants receive the 
5 
benefit of the hourly wages paid to workers who maintain the entire 
common area, including the common area immediately adjoining 
defendants1 parcels3 where weeds grow and snow is removed. Thus 
the need to include in an assessment against defendants those 
hourly wages incurred as a common expense which benefit defendants. 
Defendants receive the benefit of equipment purchased for use by 
the hourly workers to control weeds and make repairs on and around 
Defendants1 parcels; thus the need to include equipment as a common 
expense. Without incurring administrative expenses in connection 
with the condominium association, the association could not 
function and defendants would not even have a viable entity to be 
part of when defendants do decide to improve their units. 
Because there are costs associated with the ownership of 
a unit, whether improved or not, the Act and the Declaration define 
how those costs are to be divided among all owners, i.e., as common 
expenses in proportion to the percentage interest stated in the 
Declaration. Defendants have admitted in the trial court 
proceedings that they would (answer, R. 51) and should (motion in 
limine, R. 344) pay for some of the common expenses. The 
Declaration and its amendments define that amount.4 
3
 Parcel is a term defined in U.C.A. § 57-8-27(1) to include 
each unit and its percentage of undivided interest in the common 
areas and facilities, but excLuding buildings and property. This 
raises an interesting question. Since a parcel includes a unit but 
does not include a building, isn't it possible to have a unit 
without a building? 
4
 The irony of defendants' admission that they should pay 
only a portion of the common expenses associated with what 
defendants characterize as a right to build a unit, is that the 
portion of common expenses they should pay is defined in the Fourth 
6 
In footnote 1 on page 15 of defendants' brief, defendants 
state there is as issue about defendant LaWanna R. Packer, Trustee 
(hereinafter "Packer"). It is claimed Packer sold her unit under 
contract to defendant Kaiserman and that her right is solely to 
receive funds. Not only is no such claim part of the record nor 
was it raised at trial; it is directly contrary to the answer filed 
by Packer's first attorney, Jamis M. Johnson. In her answer Packer 
admits she is the owner of units 15 and 16 of phase 7-2 as alleged 
in plaintiff's complaint. Even though she may have sold her units 
under contract, she remained the fee simple owner of the unit.5 
Packer further claims because she is not an owner she cannot be 
liable to plaintiff. Such a position overlooks the nature of 
plaintiff's action. Plaintiff filed this action to foreclose a 
lien for common expenses, which foreclosure would end Packer's 
interest in the units (whether that interest is a personal property 
interest or a real property interest) since she is the record fee 
owner of the property. 
Finally, Packer asks the Court for leave to file an 
answer, suggesting that she may not have filed one. Packer is very 
Supplemental Declaration, appendix B. See Exhibit "G" to 
appellant's brief. 
5
 A unit owner is defined as a person owning a unit in fee 
simple. U.C.A. § 57-8-3(28). The Utah Supreme Court in Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), stated that the seller under 
a contract retains fee title in the seller's name: "The term 
'vendor's lien' seems to have stuck even though it is inaccurately 
used before the vendor parts with the title. Until then, it is 
not, in fact, a lien at all, but rather a retained interest in the 
land that is derived from the vendor's retention of the fee title." 
(cite omitted). Id. at 1256 n. 6. 
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much aware that she retained Attorney Jamis M. Johnson to represent 
her and to file an answer on her behalf. That is precisely what he 
did. For any number of reasons, Packerfs answer may not have found 
its way into the trial court's file, but Packer is not prejudiced 
by that failure. Plaintiff received a copy of Packer's answer and 
relied upon that pleading. Packer does not represent she did not 
retain Attorney Johnson to file an answer for her or that he did 
not represent her as agreed. Packer should not be granted leave of 
court to answer a complaint that has already been answered. If she 
is permitted to file an answer in the appellate court, it should be 
the exact answer previously sent to plaintiff. 
VI. WHICH PARTIES ARE BEFORE THIS COURT? 
After filing its complaint, plaintiff received an answer 
filed in behalf of defendants Jones, Came and Avery, and an answer 
filed in behalf of defendants Packer, Kaiserman, Ferrante and GTT 
Investments. R. 48. Plaintiff's Brief, Exhibit "A". Defendants 
Jones, Came and Avery denied they owned units but offered to pay 
some of the common expenses associated with their interest at 
Country Oaks. R. 51. Defendants Packer, Kaiserman, Ferrante, and 
GTT Investments admitted they owned units but claimed because the 
units were not improved they should not be required to pay common 
expenses associated with those units. Plaintiff filed a motion for 
summary judgment against all the defendants. R. 54. Four 
defendants (Jones, Carne, Avery and Packer) chose to respond to the 
motion and three defendants (Kaiserman, Ferrante and GTT 
Investments) did not respond. The trial court denied plaintiff's 
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motion for summary judgment as to all defendants, ruled as a matter 
of law that none of the defendants owned units, and ordered a trial 
on the issue of a reasonable amount that should be paid to 
plaintiff because three defendants had offered to pay some of the 
common expenses associated with their interest at Country Oaks 
Condominium. 
As to the four defendants who had not offered to pay some 
of the common expenses, the trial court proceeding was concluded 
when plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, since 
these defendants had made no such offer; therefore no facts were 
left in dispute, and the trial court had ruled as a matter of law 
they did not own units. Since plaintiff had not sought an 
equitable remedy against these defendants and they had not offered 
to pay any common expenses, there was no claim before the court for 
trial.6 As to the defendants who had offered to pay some of the 
common expenses, trial was set. By stipulation and pursuant to a 
motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Jones, Came, Avery 
and Packer, the issues set for trial were resolved. R. 385, 387. 
So which parties are involved in this appeal? All the 
parties, contrary to the assertion of defendants on page 20 of 
their brief. Plaintiff is appealing the denial of its motion for 
summary judgment as well as those other orders as set forth in the 
6
 The trial court documents do not distinguish between one 
defendant or another. One thing that is clear is that the decision 
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment applied to all 
defendants. R. 254. Appellant's brief, exhibit "D." Attorney 
Johnson then withdrew as counsel, R. 340, 341. Plaintiff sent a 
Notice to Appoint Other Counsel or Appear in Person, R. 347, which 
was ignored by defendants. 
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docketing statement. Even though all the defendants have not filed 
briefs with this Court, they are all subject to the Court's ruling 
on this appeal. To permit any one defendant to prevail at trial or 
on an appeal by simply refusing to participate in the proceedings 
is no different than permitting a baseball team to win by refusing 
to play the game. All defendants are before the Court. 
Defendants ask the question of whether plaintiff is 
"contending that an unfilled (sic) Answer by parties who have not 
participated in this case are in some way binding on the Appellees 
herein?" Def. Brief, p. 20. Plaintiff is categorically contending 
that any answer filed by any party is binding on that party. In 
other words, those defendants who admitted they owned units are 
bound by that admission. For the trial court to rule otherwise is 
reversible error since there was no other factual basis upon which 
the court could base such a ruling.7 
Plaintiff has never stated the trial court committed 
reversible error regarding the form of the order it signed as 
suggested by defendants on page 21 of defendants' brief. Such a 
statement by defendants misconstrues the facts and does not deal 
with the same ruling or issue referred to by plaintiff in its 
brief. 
VII. KEY DECLARATION PROVISIONS 
In drafting a declaration to create a condominium it is 
essential to clearly and definitively describe which portions of 
7
 Plaintiff recognizes the question of when a unit exists 
also presents a question of law. 
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the condominium constitute common area, limited common area, 
buildings, units and land. In both the Declaration and Fourth 
Supplemental Declaration, the following five headings are found: 1) 
Description of Land, 2) General Description of Buildings, 3) 
Description of Units, 4) Description of Common Areas and 
Facilities, and 5) Description of Limited Common Areas and 
Facilities. The Act requires these five areas to be described in 
the Declaration. U.C.A. § 57-8-10(2)(a)-(e). Whenever repairs 
are needed or costs are incurred within a condominium, to prevent 
confusion it needs to be clear whether the expense or repair is the 
responsibility of the unit owner or whether it is a common expense. 
This gives insight into one of the important reasons the 
legislature required the descriptions within each of these five 
areas. Defendants1 premise that a unit does not exist until it is 
improved is based upon a narrow reading of one portion of one of 
these five descriptions. 
Defendants chose certain paragraphs out of one of the 
five headings referred to above and ignored others that provide a 
complete picture of the relationship these sections in the 
Declaration have with each other. For example, defendants quoted 
in their brief, p. 17, the first six paragraphs under the heading 
"Description of Units." Defendants omitted the final two 
paragraphs. Paragraph 8, as found on page 9 of the Declaration, 
reads in its entirety as follows: 
8. Every contract for the sale of a unit and every 
other instrument affecting title to the unit may describe 
that unit by its identifying number or symbol as 
designated in the map or maps with the appropriate 
11 
reference to the map(s) and to the Declaration, as each 
shall appear on the record of the County Recorder of 
Davis County, Utah. Such description will be construed 
to describe the Unit, together with the appurtenant 
undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, 
and to incorporate all the rights incident to ownership 
of a unit and all the limitations on such ownership as 
described in the Declaration, including all appurtenant 
undivided interests and all rights and limitations 
arising as a result of an expansion of the project 
pursuant to paragraph 24 of this Declaration, (emphasis 
added). 
Even under defendants1 theory that the instrument they 
received was a "right to build" a unit, that instrument is 
"construed to describe a unit" and incorporates all the rights and 
limitations of ownership described in the Declaration, including 
the obligation to pay common expenses. 
The difficulty in attempting to use the language 
contained under the five headings, referred to above, to resolve 
the issue before the court arises when it becomes clear that these 
five headings were included for descriptive purposes and were not 
included for the purpose of defining what a unit is or when it is 
created. A building is not described as a unit. The two are 
described under separate headings. A unit is not described as 
limited common area or a building. Each of these areas is 
separately described since they have separate characteristics and 
qualities. That portion of the Declaration intended to define (and 
not describe) what each of these areas are, is found in section 2 
of the Declaration. 
On page 16 of defendants1 brief, defendants quote in part 
from section 2.P of the Declaration, wherein "common areas and 
facilities" is defined. Defendants omit two sections of the 
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definition that are relevant in this analysis. One of those 
omitted sections is § 2.P.3 of the Declaration, which defines the 
following as part of the common area: "All foundations, columns, 
girders, beams, supports, main walls, roof..." While these items 
are clearly contained in a building, if a building exists, they are 
just as clearly not part of a unit since they are common area. 
Having a building does not mean a unit exists.8 
The other omitted section is § 2.P.4 of the Declaration, 
which includes within the common area the following: "Those common 
areas and facilities specifically set forth and designated as such 
in the map." The "map" referred to is "the record of survey map of 
Country Oaks Condominiums, recorded herewith by Declarant in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated, § 57-8-13 (1953 as amended)." 
Declaration, f 2(G), R. 273. That map, as it relates to the units 
in question herein, is shown as exhibit "I" to appellant's brief. 
The record of survey map unmistakenly defines the land where units 
are located as being privately owned and not part of the common 
area. The record of survey map shows all property to be common 
area except where units are located. That property is identified 
as "PRIVATE OWNERSHIP."9 
8
 Defendants argue that "Land is part of the common area and 
is not part of a unit." Def. Brief, p. 17. But roofs, 
foundations, walls and beams are also part of the common area. An 
observation that land is part of the common area adds nothing to a 
resolution of the issue before the court and is not accurate to the 
extent land is "privately owned," as set forth on the map. 
9
 Defendants claim that because there are no buildings on 
their land, Def. Brief p. 18, they cannot own units. Such an 
argument completely overlooks the nature of defendants1 private 
ownership interest in their units at Country Oaks. Defendants 
13 
Even the definition of "unit11 quoted by defendants, Def. 
Brief, p. 18, indicates defendants1 fee simple interest is not 
owned in common with the other unit owners at Country Oaks. 
Defendants quote paragraph 2(H) of the Declaration which defines 
unit as 
that part of the property owned in fee simple for 
independent use and shall include the elements of the 
condominium property which are not owned in common with 
the owners of the other units as shown on the map. 
(emphasis in the original). 
Are defendants fee simple owners of property? Yes. Is 
that property for independent use? Yes, defendants may use it for 
its intended purpose at any time in accordance with the terms or 
the Declaration. Is defendants' property owned in common with the 
other owners of units as shown on the map? No, the map clearly 
indicates defendants' property is subject to private ownership and 
is not owned in common. There is no conclusion to draw but that 
defendants' interest in Country Oaks Condominium consists of a 
private ownership interest in units. 
VIII. SECTION 24 OF THE DECLARATION. 
Defendants correctly assert that '"plaintiff's main point 
in this appeal is based upon § 24 of the Declaration." Def. Brief 
p. 18. Section 24.E identifies the time at which a unit becomes 
subject to the terms of the Declaration and any supplemental 
possess that interest whether they own an improved or an unimproved 
unit. It also overlooks the definition of "condominium project" 
which includes "a plan or project whereby two or more units, 
whether contained in existing or proposed apartments,...are 
separately offered for sale." U.C.A. § 57-8-3(7). (emphasis 
added). 
14 
declarations that may be filed thereafter. Section 24.E answers 
the question: When is a unit created so as to become subject to 
the terms of the Declaration? If we know when a unit is created so 
as to become subject to the terms of the Declaration, it is an 
elementary process to determine who the unit owner is for purposes 
of assessment of common expenses. 
Rather than address the substance of the language in 
Section 24.E, defendants deal with this issue in one sentence 
within one paragraph by stating what Section 24.E does not say as 
opposed to analyzing what it does say. Def. Brief p. 20. The 
Declaration could not be more clear in stating when new units are 
subject to condominium ownership and subject to the terms of the 
Declaration. Section 24.E states that "The new units shall be 
subject to [the] . . .Declaration, and. . .to condominium ownership with 
all the incidents pertaining thereto..., upon filing the 
supplemental map and supplemental Declaration...." It is 
uncontroverted that the supplemental map and the Fourth 
Supplemental Declaration were filed in 1978. The fact defendants 
were not assessed for common expenses sooner only means they 
enjoyed 11 years of ownership without having to share in the common 
expenses incurred in connection with their units. 
IX. THE ISSUE OF THE WARRANTY DEEDS. 
Defendants Jones, Cam, Avery and Packer argue the 
declarant only sold to them the "right to built" units and did not 
sell units. This argument is premised on the theory that the 
declarant could not sell that which it did not own. Nowhere is it 
15 
established that a declarant owns a "right to build" units as 
opposed to "owning" units. When a declarant transfers its interest 
in a condominium project to a grantee, the grantee then stands in 
the shoes of the declarant and possesses the same interest the 
declarant possessed. Declaration, p. 3. R. 272. The question then 
becomes: What interest does a declarant own after it creates a 
condominium by subjecting all the real property described in the 
Declaration to the terms of the Declaration? A declarant cannot 
own common area since there is no private ownership of common area 
in a condominium and common area cannot be made subject to an 
action for partition or division. U.C.A. § 57-8-7(3). A declarant 
owns "units, whether contained in existing or proposed apartments." 
U.C.A. § 57-8-3(7) (emphasis added). Units are precisely what the 
declarant that created Country Oaks Condominium owned and 
transferred to defendants by warranty deed. 
Even if, arguendo, the declarant and some of the 
defendants were successful in reversing the transaction wherein 
declarant gave defendants warranty deeds to units, the units would 
not disappear and cease to exist. Declarant would become the owner 
of the units at issue. This makes the issue of when units become 
subject to the terms of the Declaration all the more critical since 
the declarant drafted the Declaration, had it recorded, and thus 
created the units the declarant sold to defendants. Furthermore, 
to accept defendants1 claim that they did not receive deeds to 
units but only intended to receive a "right to build" units, means 
the declarant's ability to convey a warranty deed to a unit is 
16 
somehow conditioned upon defendants performing an act over which 
the declarant has no control.10 
The property rights at issue in any condominium are too 
critical to permit the declarant or any other single party to 
determine who owns what rights. Those rights are defined in the 
Declaration and publicly recorded for the benefit of all current 
and future unit owners. After the Declaration is recorded, the 
declarant is governed by its provisions as are the other owners. 
The only reserved rights given to a declarant are those dealing 
with appointment to members to the management committee. Those 
reserved rights are terminated no later than six years from the 
recording of the Declaration in the case of an expandable 
condominium such as County Oaks, U.C.A. 57-8-16.5(1)(a). 
X. CASE DISCUSSION, 
Rather than rebrief cases that speak clearly for 
themselves, plaintiff makes note of two points: first, the Wellebv 
case, Def. Brief p. 23, clearly turned on the scrivener's choosing 
to make the object of assessments "condominium parcels," as opposed 
to "units." Had the object of assessments been units, the result 
very likely would have been the result seen in Hyde, as cited in 
plaintiff's brief. Which leads to the second point, all the cases 
cited by the parties herein have turned on the language of the 
declarations involved. None of the cases cited contained a 
10
 It is not claimed by defendants that the declarant never 
owned units. That issue is ignored while defendants claim they 
received the right to build units without stating what interest in 
the condominium project the declarant owns or owned. 
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provision similar to section 24.E of the Declaration which defines 
when units become subject to the terms of the Declaration. 
XI. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS. 
In paragraph 2 on pages 28 and 29 of defendants' brief, 
defendants state in response to plaintiff's claim that defendants 
admitted in their answer to an obligation to pay common expenses: 
The defendants had offered to pay some reasonable sum in 
settlement or pursuant to a possible amendment to the 
pleadings by plaintiff to assert unjust enrichment or 
some similar remedy. 
There is no basis for such a stcitement by Defendants. 
While it is true settlement offers were made all through these 
proceedings, such is not admissible nor relevant. Defendants 
stated of their own accord in their answer to plaintiff's complaint 
the following: 
Defendants have said they are willing to pay and remain 
willing to pay a reasonable sum to cover other expenses 
related to their right to develop land within the 
condominium project. 
Defendants' answer, third defense, R. 51. 
Such an admission was not the result of settlement 
negotiations or the result of discussions regarding amending the 
pleading to assert a cause of action for unjust enrichment. 
Plaintiff views this offer as an admission of defendants possessing 
an ownership interest in units at Country Oaks and the concomitant 
obligation to pay a percentage of the common expenses. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The Declaration is clear in defining when units come into 
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existence. Units exist for all purposes and possess all the 
incidents of ownership when the supplemental map and Declaration 
are recorded. Defendants have owned units since the time they 
received deeds to units from their predecessors. 
One of the incidents of ownership associated with owning 
a unit is the obligation to pay common expenses associated with 
ownership of a unit. Substantial common expenses have been 
incurred in connection with defendants1 units, which they equitably 
and legally ought to pay. Some defendants have admitted on 
obligation to pay a portion of the common expenses. The 
Declaration states precisely what portion (percentage) of the 
common expenses defendants are required to pay. Since defendants 
have failed to pay any common expenses in connection with the units 
they own, their interest should be foreclosed as provided by law. 
Wherefore, plaintiff asks the court to reverse the order 
of the trial court and enter a judgment as prayed for in 
plaintiff's complaint. 
nil 
DATED this O^ day of October, 1991. 
RICHARD/W. JONES 
Attorney^ for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
727 
The management committee shall be responsible 
for the controlf operation and management of the project 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, this Declara-
tion and such administrative, management and operation rules, 
and regulations as it may adopt from time to time as herein 
provided, and all agreements and determinations lawfully 
made and entered into by the committee. 
The management committee shall have the authority 
to provide such facilities, in addition to those for which 
provision has already been made, as it may deem to be in 
the best interest of the unit owners and to effect the neces-
sary amendment of documents and maps in connection therewith. 
The management committee shall be known by such 
name or designation as it, or the unit owners, at any meeting 
may assign, 
10. CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP. 
Whenever there is a change of ownership of a 
residental unit and its appurtenant rights, for whatever 
reason, the management committee or the manager may require 
as condition to recognizing the new unit owner or owners as 
such, that the new unit owner or owners furnish evidence 
substantiating the new ownership. 
11. ASSESSMENTS. 
Every unit owner shall pay his proportionate 
share of the common expenses, which share shall be equal 
to the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas 
and facilities as set forth in Appendix B, as amended, from 
time to time as provided in paragraph 24 of this Declaration. 
Payment thereof shall be in such amounts and at such times 
as the management committee determines in accordance with 
the Act, the Declaration or the By-Laws. There shall be a 
